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WHEN THE DEFENDANT DOESN’T 
TESTIFY: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
CONSIDERS A REASONABLE BROKEN 
PROMISE IN BAHTUOH v. SMITH 
Abstract: In 2017, in Bahtuoh v. Smith, the Eighth Circuit held that a criminal 
defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for promising the jury that the defend-
ant would testify, but failing to deliver on that promise. This Comment argues 
that the Eighth Circuit’s decision is in line with the decisions of other circuits 
in ineffective assistance of counsel cases where counsel promised the defend-
ant’s testimony but later reneged on that promise. Courts should consider in 
their analysis, however, the impact such a decision may have on the jury, and 
that a stricter standard for evaluating counsel’s trial performance could ad-
versely affect indigent defendants. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, filing a writ of habeas corpus in federal court can 
be a state prisoner’s last significant chance at appellate review; the action is 
available only after a prisoner has exhausted all applicable state court reme-
dies.1 As many as 18,000 habeas corpus claims are filed in federal district 
courts every year.2 These claims constitute one of every fourteen civil cases 
filed in the district courts.3 An issue often raised in habeas actions is inef-
fective assistance of counsel.4  
                                                                                                                           
 1 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2012); see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (quoting Dun-
can v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)) (noting that a state must have the chance to review and 
correct infringements of a prisoner’s federal rights before federal review is appropriate). Federal 
prisoners, on the other hand, may obtain relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Under 
that statute, federal prisoners may make a motion requesting the district court to vacate, set aside, 
or correct the sentence. Id. Following the final order of the district court, the prisoner may file a 
writ of habeas corpus to the appropriate appellate court. Id. 
 2 NANCY J. KING ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT 
COURTS 1 (2007). 
 3 Id. On average, non-capital habeas claims take more than nine months from start to finish. 
Id. at 7. Successful claims are rare: out of a sample of more than 2,000 non-capital habeas petitions, 
only seven were granted. Id. at 9. A court ordering an evidentiary hearing was found to be a signif-
icant factor that increased the likelihood relief would be granted in capital cases. Id. at 10. In Cul-
len v. Pinholster, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that review of all habeas corpus petitions 
challenging state court proceedings are limited to the record developed by the state court. 563 U.S. 
170, 181 (2011). 
 4 See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 114 (2008) (referring 
to a study finding that nearly half of post-conviction relief appeals involve an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim). 
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In Minnesota in 2013, Christopher Bahtuoh, a state prisoner, argued 
that his counsel was ineffective because his attorney promised the jury that 
Bahtuoh would testify in his murder trial, but later decided against it.5 Bah-
tuoh exhausted his available avenues for state relief without triumph.6 He 
then turned to the federal courts.7 The United States District Court for the 
District of Minnesota denied relief.8 He appealed to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and, in 2017, in Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bah-
tuoh II), the Eighth Circuit denied relief, holding that the Minnesota Su-
preme Court did not unreasonably determine that Bahtuoh’s counsel was 
not ineffective.9 
Part I of this Comment details the factual background and procedural 
history of Bahtuoh II.10 Part II examines the law governing the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s adjudication of this case and examines other Circuit decisions dealing 
with similar ineffective assistance of counsel habeas corpus claims.11 Part 
III argues that the Eighth Circuit’s decision is harmonious with those of its 
sister Circuits.12 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On April 28, 2009, Christopher Bahtuoh was driving through Minne-
apolis, Minnesota, with Lamont McGee sitting in his passenger seat.13 
McGee was a gang member; Bahtuoh was not, though he associated with 
members of McGee’s gang.14 Bahtuoh and McGee drove by Kyle Parker, a 
member of a rival gang, whom Bahtuoh knew from school.15 Upon spotting 
Parker, Bahtuoh turned the car around and stopped near Parker.16 Several 
moments later, McGee shot and killed Parker, and Bahtuoh accelerated the 
car away.17 At the grand jury proceedings, Bahtuoh testified that Parker had 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See State v. Bahtuoh (Bahtuoh I), 840 N.W.2d 804, 816 (Minn. 2013), aff’d, 855 F.3d 868 
(8th Cir. 2017). 
 6 Bahtuoh v. Smith (Bahtuoh II), 855 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 7 See id. 
 8 See id. (noting that the district court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge to 
deny Bahtuoh’s habeas petition). 
 9 Id. at 873. 
 10 See infra notes 13–41 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 42–85 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 86–109 and accompanying text. 
 13 See Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d at 870; Bahtuoh I, 840 N.W.2d at 808. 
 14 Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d at 870. McGee was a member of the “I-9” gang. Id. 
 15 Id. Parker was a member of the “Taliban” gang. Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. There was conflicting testimony regarding whether the conversation that took place 
before the shots were fired was aggressive. See Appellant’s Brief at 11, 12, Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d 
868 (No. 16-2279). Approaching the car before being shot, Parker told his friends that “Fat Chris,” 
a moniker for Bahtuoh, was a “nobody.” Id. at 10. Holding her dying brother, Parker’s sister asked 
him who was responsible and Parker responded, “Chris. Fat Chris.” Id. 
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flagged him down, and that he had not seen McGee’s gun until McGee 
pulled it on Parker.18 Bahtuoh was indicted in state court on an accomplice 
theory of four counts of first-degree murder and two counts of second-
degree murder.19 He pleaded not guilty and his case was subsequently tried 
to a jury.20 
During opening statements at trial, Bahtuoh’s counsel told the jury that 
Bahtuoh would waive his right to remain silent and testify, and that they, the 
jury, should maintain open minds regarding the facts of the case until they 
had heard this testimony.21 At the close of the state’s presentation of their 
case, counsel decided to change strategies.22 Because the State had intro-
duced into evidence Bahtuoh’s grand jury testimony, which Bahtuoh’s trial 
testimony would closely mirror, and because counsel believed that the State 
had not met its burden of proof, he advised Bahtuoh not to testify.23 Bah-
tuoh heeded his counsel’s advice, and the defense rested without presenting 
any evidence.24 In counsel’s closing argument, he explained his change of 
strategy to the jury, saying that he chose not to put Bahtuoh on the stand 
because Bahtuoh’s “truthful” story was portrayed through the grand jury 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 17, at 14. 
 19 Id. at 3. Someone convicted of first-degree murder in Minnesota is automatically sentenced 
to life imprisonment. MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a) (2017). They are eligible for parole after serving 
thirty years of that life sentence. Id. § 244.05 subdiv. 4(b). Someone convicted of second-degree 
murder may be sentenced to at most forty years in prison. Id. § 609.19 subdiv. 1. 
 20 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 17, at 3. 
 21 Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d at 870. Counsel made this strategic decision after he and Bahtuoh, 
before trial, collectively decided that this would be an appropriate course of action. Id. Counsel 
stated to the jury:  
You also know that Mr. Bahtuoh has a right to remain silent. He will waive that 
right . . . . [H]e is going to tell you the truth . . . . I would ask you to keep an open 
mind . . . . Wait until he takes the stand and tells you what happened. 
Bahtuoh I, 840 N.W.2d at 816. Counsel promised the jury that they would hear certain evidence 
that could only come from Bahtuoh; for example, that the victim was not his enemy and that he 
had reason to believe that McGee, the shooter, was not armed that day. Appellant’s Brief, supra 
note 17, at 9. 
 22 See Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d at 870 (noting that counsel decided to alter courses in part be-
cause he believed the State’s evidence was insufficient to meet its burden). 
 23 Id. Through Bahtuoh’s grand jury testimony, the jury heard from Bahtuoh’s perspective 
that Parker flagged him down, that he had not seen McGee’s gun until he pulled it on Parker, that 
he went into hiding following the shooting, and that he was not a gang member, but did associate 
with such individuals. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 17, at 14, 15. Counsel’s prediction about the 
strength of the State’s case proved to be, in part, true. Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d at 870. The jury ac-
quitted Bahtuoh of two counts of first-degree murder. Bahtuoh I, 840 N.W.2d at 808. 
 24 Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d at 870. In the record of the colloquy in which Bahtuoh informed the 
court that he would not testify, counsel stated that he had spoken with Bahtuoh “on several occa-
sions” about whether he should waive his Fifth Amendment privilege, and that they had discussed 
the “pros and cons” of each option. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 17, at 12. Bahtuoh answered in 
the affirmative that he had received time to consider his options. Id. at 13. He stated “I will not 
testify,” and indicated that he did not require more time to consider his decision. Id. 
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testimony, and that the government had not proved its case.25 Bahtuoh was 
subsequently convicted on two of the four counts of first-degree murder and 
two counts of second-degree murder, and was sentenced to life imprison-
ment with the possibility of parole after serving thirty-one years.26 
Bahtuoh first sought postconviction relief in the state court by arguing, 
inter alia, that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.27 The court 
denied relief.28 He then appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, where 
he argued several claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel.29 The 
state supreme court also denied relief and affirmed his conviction.30 Bah-
tuoh then turned to the federal courts, filing a habeas corpus petition under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254 and positing several claims, among them ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.31 A United States magistrate judge issued a Report and 
Recommendation to deny the habeas claim, which the United States District 
Court for the District of Minnesota adopted.32 The district court issued a 
certificate of appealability for the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.33 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d at 870. Counsel asked the jury to fault him for Bahtuoh’s decision not 
to take the stand: “Mr. Bahtuoh did not take the stand. I told you he would. That’s my fault.” Ap-
pellant’s Brief, supra note 17, at 15. He further explained,  
[W]hy should I put him on the stand? . . . When they didn’t prove their case and got 
his grand jury testimony read to you, which he gave under oath . . . which exoner-
ates him. Why would I put a 20-year-old young man up against an experienced 
prosecutor? 
Id. 
 26 See Bahtuoh I, 840 N.W.2d at 808. 
 27 Id. Bahtuoh also argued that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on accomplice 
liability, that he did not voluntarily waive his right to testify, that he should have been granted a 
mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct, and that he was denied the right to a public trial. Id. 
 28 Id. at 809. Having promptly denied his other post-conviction relief claims, the court held an 
evidentiary hearing on Bahtuoh’s claim that he did not voluntarily waive his right to testify. Id. at 
808−09. He was the only witness to testify at the hearing, and he stated that, contrary to the trial 
colloquy record, trial counsel had not advised him about the pros and cons of testifying, but had 
told him to simply state that he understood the questions he would be asked during the colloquy. 
Id. at 809. 
 29 Id. at 807−08. Bahtuoh also argued that the record was factually insufficient to support his 
conviction, that the accomplice liability instruction was legally incorrect, that he was coerced into 
not testifying at trial, that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new 
trial, that the jury’s verdicts were legally inconsistent, and that he should have been granted an 
evidentiary hearing on whether he was denied a public trial. Id. 
 30 Id. at 808. 
 31 Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d at 871. 
 32 Id. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for a magistrate judge to hear a prisoner’s 
petition that challenges her “conditions of confinement.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(1). The magistrate 
judge then enters a recommended disposition of the issue. Id. If a party objects to the recommen-
dation, then a district court judge will review the magistrate judge’s recommendation and can elect 
to accept, reject, or modify the recommendation. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). 
 33 Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d at 871. For a prisoner to appeal a district court’s denial of a habeas 
corpus petition, the district court must first issue a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) 
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Bahtuoh embraced the opportunity to appeal this aspect of his habeas claim 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; he argued that 
the Minnesota Supreme Court unreasonably applied the law and unreasona-
bly determined the facts in deciding his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.34 
The Eighth Circuit was restricted in its review of the effectiveness of 
counsel’s assistance because 28 U.S.C. § 2254 requires deference to the state 
court’s adjudication of the claim, and because the ineffective assistance of 
counsel standard announced by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washing-
ton requires that federal appellate courts presume trial counsel’s representa-
tion was acceptable.35 The Eighth Circuit endorsed the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s determination that counsel’s decision to advise Bahtuoh not to testify 
was sound strategy, and thus not ineffective assistance.36 The court noted that, 
through Bahtuoh’s grand jury testimony being read into evidence and coun-
sel’s cross-examination of state witnesses, the jury heard the evidence counsel 
had promised during his opening statement.37 Specifically, the jury heard that 
Bahtuoh knew the victim and that he was unaware McGee had a gun.38 The 
court also observed that counsel based his decision on his partially correct 
belief that the state had not met its burden in proving Bahtuoh guilty.39 Be-
cause the state court considered these “unexpected developments” in deter-
mining whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable, the Eighth Circuit de-
clined to find the state appellate court’s application of the Strickland standard 
                                                                                                                           
(2012) (requiring the petitioner to make a “substantial showing” of a constitutional right violation 
for a certificate of appealability to issue, and requiring the issuing court to specify for which issues 
the showing has been made); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335−36 (2003) (noting that 
a state prisoner seeking appeal of a district court’s habeas ruling is not automatically entitled to 
appellate review of that decision, and that an appeals court lacks jurisdiction to review such a 
ruling unless a certificate of appealability has been issued). 
 34 Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d at 871. Bahtuoh claimed that the Minnesota Supreme Court was un-
reasonable in determining that counsel’s decision to urge Bahtuoh not to testify, after promising 
the jury that Bahtuoh would testify, was not objectively unreasonable. Id. He claimed that the state 
supreme court unreasonably determined the facts in finding that counsel did not foresee the weak-
nesses in the State’s case, and in finding that counsel considered the risks of not calling Bahtuoh 
to testify when he cautioned him against testifying. Id. at 873. 
 35 Id. at 871, 872. The Court noted that its review of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s applica-
tion of the Strickland v. Washington standard is “doubly deferential,” because the court must ac-
cord deference to counsel’s trial strategy as well as to the state court’s adjudication of the reasona-
bleness of that strategy. Id. (citing Cullen, 563 U.S. at 190). 
 36 Id. at 873. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. When the verdicts were read, Bahtuoh was found not guilty on two of the six murder 
counts. Bahtuoh I, 840 N.W.2d at 808. 
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unreasonable.40 The Eighth Circuit also concluded that the Minnesota Su-
preme Court did not unreasonably determine the facts.41 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS FOR INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS 
Section A of this Part will detail the history and Supreme Court inter-
pretation of aspects of habeas corpus petitions.42 Section B will describe the 
standard for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.43 Section C will ana-
lyze how federal courts have applied the ineffective assistance of counsel 
standard to broken promises made by defense counsel.44 
A. Habeas Corpus Petitions for State Prisoners 
The habeas corpus petition is a venerated feature of the American jus-
tice system, providing defendants a “bulwark” from fundamentally unfair 
convictions.45 The writ of habeas corpus, in part, provides a citizen convict-
ed in a state court the opportunity to have the constitutionality of her con-
viction reviewed by a federal court.46 In 1996, Congress passed the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which modified the 
role of the federal courts when considering state prisoners’ habeas claims.47 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d at 873. Having found no ineffective assistance of counsel, the Eighth 
Circuit was not compelled to consider, as required under the second prong of the Strickland test, 
whether counsel’s assistance prejudiced the trial. Id. at 871, 873. 
 41 Id. at 874. Bahtuoh argued that the Minnesota Supreme Court unreasonably determined that 
the extent of the weaknesses of the State’s case were unforeseen to counsel and that counsel 
weighed the risks of not having Bahtuoh testify. Id. at 873. If the state court’s factual conclusions 
are supported by the record, then it did not unreasonably determine the facts. Evenstad v. Carlson, 
470 F.3d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 2006). Based on the trial record, the Eighth Circuit found that counsel 
was only partially correct about the extent of the weaknesses in the State’s case. Bahtuoh II, 855 
F.3d at 873. For example, counsel established through cross-examination that the victim had mo-
tioned towards Bahtuoh, which supported Bahtuoh’s grand jury testimony. Id. The Eighth Circuit 
also found that the trial record demonstrated that counsel weighed the risks of Bahtuoh testifying. 
Id. at 874. Counsel stated during the colloquy when Bahtuoh informed the court that he would not 
testify that he had spoken to Bahtuoh about the issue and that they had weighed the “pros and 
cons” of not testifying. Id. 
 42 See infra notes 45–54 and accompanying text. 
 43 See infra notes 55–64 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 65–85 and accompanying text. 
 45 Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 46 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012); John H. Blume & David P. Voisin, An Introduction to Federal 
Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, 47 SUP. CT. L. REV. 271, 273 (1996). 
 47 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The statute mandates that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus origi-
nating from a defendant in state custody, whose claim has already been decided on the merits in 
the state court, will not be issued unless the state court adjudication: “1) resulted in a decision that 
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law . . . or 
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In particular, AEDPA mandates that federal courts provide increased defer-
ence to the decisions of state courts that have already adjudicated claims 
raised in habeas petitions.48 AEDPA allows federal courts to grant a writ of 
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 when the claim was previously adju-
dicated in state court.49 A federal court may grant a habeas claim if the state 
court’s decision unreasonably applied “clearly established Federal law.”50 In 
2000, in Williams v. Taylor, the United States Supreme Court held that un-
der this provision of AEDPA, federal courts may grant a habeas claim if the 
state court unreasonably applied a governing legal principle established by 
the Supreme Court to the facts of the defendant’s case.51 This requires that 
the state court decision be objectively unreasonable, not merely incorrect or 
                                                                                                                           
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. 
 48 See Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas Corpus Under the 
New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1869−70 (1997) (noting that before the passage 
of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), federal courts performed an inde-
pendent review of mixed question cases, while after they presumed state court decisions to be 
correct). Prior to passage of the AEDPA, federal courts split habeas claims that had been adjudi-
cated by state courts into three categories: those presenting questions of fact, those presenting 
mixed questions of fact and law, and those presenting questions of law. Id. at 1869. In question of 
fact claims, state court decisions were provided deference, and a federal court could independently 
review the decision only if it believed there was reason to do so, or one of eight statutory excep-
tions was met. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963) (observing 
that a district court judge has the discretion to accept the findings of the state court with regard to 
a habeas claim), rev’d on other grounds, Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). In 
mixed question of fact and law claims, federal courts undertook an independent review. See 
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112−13 (1995) (holding that whether a suspect was “in cus-
tody” for the purposes of Miranda warnings was a mixed question of fact and law, justifying in-
dependent review). In question of law cases, federal courts undertook independent reviews of 
legal questions. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985) (holding that voluntariness of a con-
fession is a legal question requiring independent federal consideration). AEDPA was, in part, an 
effort to reduce the ability of federal courts to review habeas petitions. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 
685, 693 (2002) (noting that AEDPA was intended to prevent retrials in federal court and to pro-
vide finality to state court decisions); see also Tommy Zippleman, The Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel Era, 63 SUP. CT. L. REV. 425, 428 (2011) (noting that federal habeas doctrine has 
evolved to favor finality). In effect, however, habeas claims increased following the enactment of 
AEDPA. JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NJC 189430, PRISONER PETITIONS FILED IN U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS, 2000, WITH TRENDS 1980–2000, at 7 (2002) (determining that 18,000 more 
habeas petitions were filed because of AEDPA between April 1996 and September 2000). 
 49 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
 50 Id. § 2254(d)(1). The provision also allows federal courts to grant habeas claims if the state 
court decision was “contrary to . . . clearly established federal law.” Id. The Supreme Court has 
held that under this provision, a federal court may grant a habeas claim if a state court reached a 
conclusion contrary to the Supreme Court on an issue of law, or if the state court decides the case 
differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Tay-
lor, 529 U.S. 362, 412−13 (2000). 
 51 Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 
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erroneous.52 A state court decision is not objectively unreasonable if “fair-
minded jurists” could reach differing conclusions as to its soundness.53 A 
federal court may also grant a habeas claim if the state court’s decision was 
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts before it.54 
B. The Constitutional Requirements of Ineffective  
Assistance of Counsel Claims 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 
criminal defendants the “Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”55 This 
provision is not met, however, if “a person who happens to be a lawyer” 
stands next to the defendant during the trial.56 The Supreme Court has con-
cluded that because the implied purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to pro-
duce a fair trial, the right to counsel means the right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel.57 
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court elucidated a standard on 
which claims of “actual ineffectiveness” of counsel’s assistance should be 
                                                                                                                           
 52 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). It is not enough that the decision is incorrect 
in the court’s independent judgment. Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; see also U.S. ex rel. Hampton v. 
Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 245 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that “[u]nreasonable means something more 
than mistaken”) (citing Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 25 (2002) (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 53 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 
652, 664 (2004)). 
 54 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court decision unreasonably determines the facts if the 
court’s factual findings, which are presumed to be correct, are not supported by the record. Even-
stad v. Carlson, 470 F.3d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 55 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Juveniles are also provided with counsel during delinquency pro-
ceedings, although this was not always the case. See Tamar R. Birckhead, The Racialization of 
Juvenile Justice and the Role of the Defense Attorney, 58 B.C. L. REV. 379, 428−29 (2017) (dis-
cussing the historical evolution of the role of defense counsel in delinquency proceedings). 
 56 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 
 57 Id. at 685−86 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). In Cuyler 
v. Sullivan, the Court held that, because a criminal trial is state action, both privately retained and 
court appointed counsel are held to the effectiveness standards read into the Sixth Amendment. 
446 U.S. 335, 344−45 (1980). Research indicates that, despite prevailing beliefs, court appointed 
counsel are about as effective as privately retained counsel at achieving favorable outcomes for 
clients. Richard D. Hartley et al., Do You Get What You Pay For? Type of Counsel and Its Effect 
on Criminal Court Outcomes, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 1063, 1064 (2010). At trial in state court in the 
seventy-five largest counties in the United States, 4.4% and 4.3% of defendants were found guilty 
when represented by appointed and retained counsel, respectively. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NJC 179023, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000). But see 
Derwyn Bunton, Opinion, No Lawyer to Spare for Poor in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 
2016, at A31 (noting that the New Orleans Public Defender’s office ceased accepting new cases to 
represent indigent clients as a result of a history of budget cuts, and that the office’s workload is 
twice that recommended by the American Bar Association). 
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analyzed.58 The Strickland standard has two prongs that a defendant must 
prove.59 First, a defendant must demonstrate that her trial counsel’s represen-
tation was “deficient;” in other words, that it fell below an “objective standard 
of reasonableness.”60 The Supreme Court intentionally described a vague 
standard to ensure the preservation of defense counsel’s wide latitude in de-
ciding trial strategy.61 Further, because with hindsight any decision could be 
deemed unwise or unreasonable, a defendant must overcome a presumption 
that the challenged trial strategy was sound.62 Even if a court determines that 
counsel provided ineffective assistance, because the purpose of the Sixth 
Amendment is to provide a fair trial, the second prong of the Strickland 
standard requires the defendant to prove that the ineffectiveness actually prej-
udiced the defense for the conviction to be overturned.63 The Court held that a 
defendant must show there was a “reasonable probability” that without coun-
sel’s errors, the outcome at trial would have been different.64 
C. Federal Courts Have Not Unanimously Found That Breaking a Promise 
Made in Opening Statements Is Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Courts other than the Eight Circuit have decided habeas claims of inef-
fective assistance of counsel where counsel promises the defendant will 
testify but does not call the defendant to testify.65 In federal courts, the dis-
                                                                                                                           
 58 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684. The Court had previously concluded that the government can 
violate the right to effective assistance of counsel in certain situations where it hinders the ability 
of counsel to make independent strategy judgments. Id. at 686. The Court in part developed the 
standard to provide guidance to the circuit courts, which had adopted varying, although substan-
tially similar, tests for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id. at 684. The claim in Strickland 
v. Washington concerned a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sen-
tencing proceeding. Id. at 686. The Court concluded that a capital sentencing proceeding, but not a 
normal sentencing proceeding, which can be an informal proceeding, is similar enough to a trial 
that the ineffectiveness standards elucidated apply to both. Id. at 686−87. 
 59 Id. at 687. 
 60 Id. at 687−88. 
 61 Id. at 688−89 (citing United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). The 
purpose of the Sixth Amendment, the Court stated, is to provide a fair trial for the defendant, not 
to raise the bar of representation standards. Id. at 689. 
 62 Id. at 689. The defendant must identify specific acts or omissions that constituted unreason-
able strategy. Id. at 690. 
 63 Id. at 691−92. 
 64 Id. at 694. A “reasonable probability” means a probability that erodes a court’s certainty in 
the outcome of the proceeding. Id. The Court rejected the higher preponderance of evidence 
standard, which is used in assessing claims that newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial, 
because a trial can be rendered prejudicial by ineffective assistance of counsel even if the ineffec-
tive assistance cannot be shown by a preponderance of evidence to have affected the outcome. Id. 
at 693−94. 
 65 See Hampton, 347 F.3d at 257, 258; Ouber v. Gaurino, 293 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2002); 
Madrigal v. Yates, 662 F. Supp. 2d. 1162, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
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positive issue for deciding such claims is whether the about-face is predi-
cated on unforeseen circumstances.66 
In 2002, in Ouber v. Gaurino, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit applied the Strickland standard to a scenario where counsel 
reneged on a promise to call the defendant to testify.67 In two consecutive 
state court criminal trials, the juries could not agree on the defendant’s guilt, 
and the judge declared mistrials.68 During both trials, the defendant elected 
to testify to explain her side of the story.69 The government, keen on seeing 
justice done, presented the case to a jury a third time, but despite counsel’s 
promise to the jury that the defendant would testify, she did not, and the 
jury convicted.70 A habeas claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fol-
lowed, and the First Circuit agreed with the defendant that counsel’s deci-
sion not to call the defendant to testify constituted ineffective assistance.71 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Hampton, 347 F.3d at 257, 258; Ouber, 293 F.3d at 27; Madrigal, 662 F. Supp. 2d. at 
1184; see also Robinson v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 2d. 684, 693 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (finding 
counsel’s decision not to call the defendant after promising defendant’s testimony in his opening 
statement was unreasonable absent an unforeseen event warranting a change in strategy). 
 67 See Ouber, 293 F.3d at 27. The defendant in Ouber was indicted under state law for traf-
ficking in cocaine. Id. at 21. The defendant was alleged to have sold two ounces of cocaine to an 
undercover police officer. Id. The officer testified that he entered the defendant’s car, the defend-
ant handed him two envelopes, he confirmed with the defendant the quantity of cocaine therein, he 
gave her the money, and he opened the envelopes to check their contents. Id. The defendant main-
tained that she, the defendant, assented to help her brother carry out an errand that she did not 
believe was related to drug dealing. Id. She testified that she did not hand the officer the enve-
lopes, they were sitting on the passenger seat, that they never conversed about the cocaine, and 
that the officer never checked the contents of the envelopes. Id. 
 68 Id. at 22. At the second trial, the presentation of evidence proceeded much like the first trial. 
Id. 
 69 Id. at 23. 
 70 Id. at 22, 23. During counsel’s opening statements, he promised four times that the defendant 
would testify and that her testimony would be crucial to the jury’s decision. Id. at 22. Counsel stated, 
“The case is going to come down to what happened in that car and what your findings are as you 
listen to the credibility and the testimony of [the police officer] versus what you[r] findings are as 
you listen to the testimony of [the defendant].” Id. He went on to say, “you’re going to have to 
decide the truth and veracity of those two witnesses; and that will be your ultimate decision in this 
case.” Id. The defense presented the same witnesses it had during the preceding two trials, until 
counsel elected not to call the defendant as a witness. Id. at 23. Counsel apologized in his closings 
for not providing “more of a case.” Id. He claimed that the police officer’s testimony, considered 
in tandem with the testimony of a defense witness, allowed the jury to conclude that the defendant 
was ignorant as to the contents of the envelope. Id. The jury was deadlocked. Id. The trial judge 
instructed the jury to deliberate further, and eventually they returned a guilty verdict. Id. In Massa-
chusetts, where the case was tried, case law allows judges to provide an instruction encouraging 
deadlocked juries to reach a consensus. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 300 N.E.2d 192, 200 
(Mass. 1973). 
 71 Ouber, 293 F.3d at 20, 27, 30. The trial judge denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial, 
a decision the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed. Id. at 24. The state supreme court declined 
to hear the case. Id. The appellate court described counsel’s opening remarks regarding the de-
fendant’s proffered testimony as “neither dramatic nor memorable.” Id. The defendant desired to 
testify. Id. She was, however, dissuaded by counsel. Id. In an on the record conversation about her 
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The First Circuit concluded that counsel broke his promise to provide 
critical testimony.72 Because there were no unforeseeable events “forcing” 
counsel to change strategies, counsel’s decision was “an error in profession-
al judgment.”73 In so holding, the First Circuit did allow that, in certain cir-
cumstances, unforeseen developments may justify changes in trial strate-
gy.74 The First Circuit also concluded that the state court’s reading of the 
trial record was unreasonable, disagreeing with the state court’s characteri-
zation of counsel’s decision as cautious.75 
Similarly, in 2003, in U.S. ex rel. Hampton v. Leibach, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that defense counsel’s 
promise in his opening statements that the defendant would testify that he 
was not involved in the alleged criminal acts, and counsel’s later breaking 
of that promise, was unreasonable.76 Important to the court’s decision was 
the lack of any unforeseeable events occurring at trial that would have justi-
                                                                                                                           
decision, however, counsel never notified her of the negative impact that his earlier promises might 
have if she did not testify. Id. The Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted 
the defendant’s habeas claim, overturning the state appellate court’s decision. Id. at 20. 
 72 Id. at 27. 
 73 Id. The court noted that counsel placed the defendant’s testimony at the center of his defense, 
but decided not to have her testify “with no discernible justification.” Id. at 27, 35. The court found 
no remarkable change in the defense’s case from the time counsel made his promise to the time he 
elected not to call the defendant. Id. at 35−36. His decision thus constituted a “serious error in profes-
sional judgment . . . .” Id. at 36. 
 74 Id. at 29. “[U]nexpected developments sometimes may warrant changes in previously unan-
nounced trial strategies.” Id. But here, counsel had the remarkable benefit of his experience during 
the first two trials, where the defendant testified, and the outcome was favorable to her. Id. At the 
third trial, when counsel decided not to have the defendant testify, he was presented with essentially 
the same situation as he had encountered in the previous two trials. Id. The previous trials thus served 
as a “meaningful benchmark” in helping the court determine that counsel’s decision affected the 
outcome of the trial. Id. at 36. Later, in Yeboah-Sefah v. Ficco, the First Circuit concluded that prom-
ising testimony from psychologists and psychiatrists, but not calling any to testify, was not dramatic 
enough of a broken promise to justify habeas relief. See 556 F.3d 53, 76, 78 (1st Cir. 2009). In that 
case, defense counsel at best made an implied promise to present expert medical testimony to 
support a lack of criminal responsibility defense. Id. at 76. Counsel stated in his opening that 
“psychologists and psychiatrists will talk about the medical affects [sic] of [the defendant’s] medi-
cation” and that there would be “testimony by experts.” Id. at 77 n.17. The jurors did hear testi-
mony from a psychologist and a psychiatrist over the course of the trial, but not the expert con-
templated by the defense. Id. at 77, 78. The court concluded that even if there was an implied 
promise, it was not the dramatic type of promise, the breach of which would allow a court to over-
turn a conviction. Id. at 78. 
 75 Ouber, 293 F.3d at 31. 
 76 Hampton, 347 F.3d at 257, 258. Here the defendant, eighteen years old at the time of his 
arrest and having never been arrested previously, was convicted of deviate sexual assault, attempted 
rape, robbery, and aggravated battery for events that took place at a concert. Id. at 221, 222. He was 
sentenced to sixty years in prison. Id. at 221. Counsel told the jury in his opening statement that “Mr. 
Hampton will testify and tell you that he was at the concert. Mr. Hampton will tell you that he saw 
what happened but was not involved with it.” Id. at 257. 
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fied counsel’s change in strategy.77 The court also noted that the jury was 
promised an alternate version of events from those presented by the State.78 
In not calling the defendant to testify, the jury was left bereft of that differ-
ent story, and counsel essentially conveyed to the jury that the condemning 
testimony of the state’s witnesses was correct.79 Although the court found 
counsel’s decision unreasonable, it also found that such a decision, standing 
alone, did not sufficiently prejudice the defendant to warrant habeas relief.80 
Likewise, in 2009, in Madrigal v. Yates, the United States District 
Court for the Western District of California, relying in part upon Ouber and 
Hampton, concluded that counsel’s assistance was ineffective where, in his 
opening remarks, he promised that the defendant would testify but later de-
cided not to call him.81 The defendant’s counsel in Madrigal did not explain 
to the jury during his closing arguments why he did not call the defendant, 
and the court found no unforeseeable events that would have warranted 
such a change in strategy.82 
In 2002, in Yancey v. Hall, on the other hand, the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts concluded that counsel’s unfulfilled 
promise in his opening statement, that the defendant would testify, did not 
constitute ineffective assistance.83 The court ruled that, although counsel’s 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Id. at 257, 258. Counsel justified his decision not to call the defendant on his fear that the 
defendant’s testimony would render him guilty by association. Id. at 258. But this disadvantage of the 
defendant’s testimony was as apparent at the beginning of the case as it was at the time counsel could 
call the defendant to testify. Id. It is not a “legitimate” trial strategy to make promises but break them 
“for reasons that were apparent at the time the promises were made . . . .” Id. at 259. 
 78 Id. at 258. 
 79 Id. The court commented that counsel essentially told the jury two versions of the events ex-
isted, but in the end the jury was left only with the State’s version of events. Id. 
 80 Id. at 260. The court affirmed the defendant’s habeas petition claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel because counsel also failed to investigate potentially exculpatory witnesses, whose names the 
defendant provided to counsel. Id. at 247, 260. 
 81 Madrigal, 662 F. Supp. 2d. at 1180, 1183−84. In this case, the defendant was convicted of 
attempted murder and the use of a handgun in association with a street gang. Id. at 1166−67. In his 
opening remarks, counsel stated that “you’re going to hear from my client. He’ll explain to you who 
he believes did that crime he is charged with . . . he’s basically signing his own death warrant by 
testifying in open court that a fellow gang member committed this crime.” Id. at 1180. 
 82 Id. at 1184 (quoting Ouber, 293 F.3d at 29). The defendant claimed that, at trial, he was ready 
to testify about his alibi, and the reasons he believed another individual was the shooter, but that 
counsel, without forewarning the defendant, elected not to call the defendant as a witness. Id. at 1180. 
At an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, however, counsel argued that 
the co-defendant threatened his client during the trial, and for that reason did not put him on the 
stand. Id. at 1180−81. The defendant countered that, despite the unabated threats on his life, from the 
beginning of his incarceration through to trial, he was willing to testify to secure his innocence. Id. at 
1181. Defense counsel had written in a letter that he did not call the defendant because the defendant 
had not wanted to testify. Id. at 1182. The court credited the defendant’s version of events. Id. at 
1181. 
 83 Yancy v. Hall, 237 F. Supp. 2d. 128, 132, 134, 136 (D. Mass. 2002). Here, the defendant 
was convicted of distribution of cocaine in a school zone. Id. at 129. The prosecution presented 
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decision involved a “significant misstep,” when considered within the con-
text of the entire trial, that misstep did not amount to ineffective assistance 
of counsel.84 Counsel did not make the defendant’s testimony the focal 
point of the defense, or tell the jury multiple times that the defendant would 
testify, and counsel presented a defense that did not rely on the promised 
testimony from the defendant.85 
III. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL STANDARD 
In Bahtuoh v. Smith, the Eighth Circuit correctly applied the emerging 
federal analysis for ineffective assistance of counsel claims when the de-
fendant’s counsel promises the defendant’s testimony but does not deliver 
it.86 At the start of the trial, Bahtuoh’s counsel could not have anticipated 
that the State would have Bahtuoh’s grand jury testimony read into evi-
dence.87 Counsel was also able to cross-examine the prosecution’s witness-
es.88 Together, these two opportunities allowed counsel to enter into evi-
dence, albeit indirectly, the information that he anticipated providing to the 
jury through the direct testimony of Bahtuoh, which was promised.89 
Counsel’s decision to break his promise in Bahtouh is different from 
those cases in which other courts have deemed counsels’ broken promises 
unreasonable.90 Bahtuoh’s case is distinguishable from the remarkable cir-
                                                                                                                           
evidence that the defendant had sold twenty dollars’ worth of crack to an undercover police of-
ficer. Id. The defendant was sentenced to consecutive five- and two-year sentences. Id. at 130. 
During opening statements at trial, counsel stated, “[Y]ou will find that [the defendant] will tell 
you, and we’ll show that . . . [the defendant] was not there . . . .” Id. at 129. At the close of the 
government’s case, the defense rested without presenting any evidence. Id. at 130. 
 84 Id. at 135. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See U.S. ex rel. Hampton v. Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 257, 258 (7th Cir. 2003); Ouber v. 
Gaurino, 293 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2002). In Williams v. Bowersox, the Eighth Circuit examined a 
partially similar case. See generally 340 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2003). The defendant was convicted of 
first degree murder, arising from the shooting of a fourteen-year-old boy, and was sentenced to 
life imprisonment without the opportunity of parole. Id. at 668. On appeal, the defendant argued 
that counsel was ineffective because he did not call certain witnesses whose testimony was im-
plied in the defense’s opening statement. Id. In rejecting the defendant’s claim, the court noted 
counsel’s decision to reconsider presenting the promised witnesses and counsel’s reasons for 
changing strategy, including his belief that he had overcome the State’s case through his cross-
examination of its witnesses. Id. at 669, 672. 
 87 See Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See Hampton, 347 F.3d at 257, 259; Ouber, 293 F.3d at 22, 23, 27. In Hampton, counsel 
promised the defendant’s testimony and ultimately decided not to call him to the stand, but that deci-
sion was predicated on factors as apparent to counsel at the beginning of trial, when he made his 
opening statements, as at the time he elected not to call the defendant to the stand. See 347 F.3d at 
257, 259. The court concluded that counsel made an unreasonable decision by not calling the defend-
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cumstances in Ouber v. Guarino.91 Bahtuoh’s counsel did not have the ben-
efit of two previous and nearly identical trials on which to base his strate-
gy.92 Although the defense in both Ouber and Bahtuoh was centered around 
the defendant’s testimony, in Ouber counsel did not fulfill his promises to 
the jury about what the defendant’s testimony would hold using other evi-
dence.93 On the other hand, in Bahtuoh, counsel did not require the defend-
ant’s testimony in order to provide the with jury the evidence he promised 
in his opening.94 
The circumstances in Bahtouh are also distinguishable from those in 
U.S. ex rel. Hampton v. Leibach.95 In Hampton, counsel justified his change 
in strategy on reasons that were apparent at the beginning of the trial, and 
never delivered the promised alternate version of events to contrast the gov-
ernment’s story.96 In Bahtouh, however, counsel could not have known at 
the outset that the government would read Bahtuoh’s grand jury testimony 
into evidence.97 That testimony presented the jury with the alternate version 
of events counsel promised in his opening statement.98 Additionally, it al-
lowed Bahtuoh’s version of events to enter into evidence without exposing 
Bahtuoh to cross-examination by an experienced prosecutor.99 
When assessing the reasonableness of defense counsel’s decision to 
break her promise, courts should examine, in addition to whether unfore-
seen circumstances support the decision, whether counsel considered the 
                                                                                                                           
ant to testify after promising as much, but alone that decision was not enough to warrant habeas re-
lief. See id. In Ouber, counsel promised that the defendant would testify and decided later not to call 
her to the stand. See 293 F.3d at 22, 23, 27.  Counsel had the experience of two previous trials, how-
ever, in which the defendant did testify and the outcome was favorable to her, to draw from when 
preparing for the third trial. See id. Events in the third trial proceeded in a similar fashion to the first 
two, so there were no unforeseeable events to justify counsel breaking his promise in opening state-
ments. See id. 
 91 Compare Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d at 870 (describing only one trial where counsel represented 
petitioner), with Ouber, 293 F.3d at 29 (noting that counsel represented petitioner at two previous 
trials for the same offense before representing her for a third time at the trial at issue). 
 92 See Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d at 870. 
 93 Compare id. (noting that counsel believed the State had already introduced most of the 
evidence that he planned to introduce through the defendant’s testimony), with Ouber, 293 F.3d at 
29−30 (finding that another witness who testified could not adequately testify as the defendant 
may have). 
 94 See Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d at 873. 
 95 Compare id. (noting that Bahtuoh’s counsel neither could have predicted that Bahtuoh’s 
relationship with the victim, nor that Bahtuoh didn’t know the shooter was armed, would come 
into evidence without his having to call Bahtuoh to testify as promised), with Hampton, 347 F.3d 
at 257, 258 (finding that the defendant’s version of events did not come into evidence when the de-
fendant did not testify as counsel promised). 
 96 Hampton, 347 F.3d at 257, 258. 
 97 See Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d at 873. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See Bahtuoh I, 840 N.W.2d 804, 817 (Minn. 2013) (quoting Bahtuoh’s counsel’s closing 
argument). 
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impact that such a reversal may have on the jury.100 Making a promise in 
opening statements and not delivering on that promise is a near universally 
disdained trial technique.101 In any given trial, however, there is a litany of 
potential tactics that counsel can legitimately wield.102 There are few rigid 
requirements for counsel to meet in order to be considered constitutionally 
effective.103 Depending on the circumstances, even significant decisions, 
such as waiving an opening statement entirely, can be considered sound 
strategy.104 But when counsel promises to present the defendant and reneges 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (noting that not even the best coun-
sel may be able to speak for the defendant with “halting eloquence,” as the defendant himself 
might); Saesee v. McDonald, 725 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that when counsel 
breaks a promise with the jury, he ruptures the jury’s trust in his client, impacting the juror’s abil-
ity to maintain an open mind); McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 166−67 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(commenting that the rationale for finding ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel fails to 
deliver promised testimony is that the jury may infer that the witness was “unwilling or unable” to 
provide the testimony). 
 101 See Saesee, 725 F.3d at 1049 (noting that when counsel breaks a promise with the jury, he 
ruptures the jury’s trust in his client, impacting the jurors’ collective ability to maintain an open 
mind); Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d 16, 17 (1st Cir. 1988) (remarking that failing to produce 
promised evidence can be quite damaging); see also DOMINIC J. GIANNA & LISA A. MARCY, 
OPENING STATEMENTS: WINNING IN THE BEGINNING BY WINNING THE BEGINNING § 16:2 (2015–
2016 ed. 2015) (instructing practitioners to “never, ever” make promises in openings that cannot 
be kept, because doing so is a self-inflicted fatal blow to the case); Michael J. Ahlen, Opening 
Statements in Jury Trials: What Are the Legal Limits?, 71 N.D. L. REV. 701, 706 (1995) (noting 
that failing to keep a promise made during opening statements negatively demerits the defense’s 
case). Indeed, one criminal trial practice manual recommends maintaining a checklist of promises the 
opposition made during their opening statements so as to highlight for the jury any unfulfilled prom-
ises. LAURIE L. LEVENSON, WEST’S CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 23:40 (2016). 
 102 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688−89 (1984) (instructing courts to embrace 
a presumption that “counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assis-
tance . . . .”); see also Williams v. Woodford, 859 F. Supp. 2d. 1154, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (not-
ing that a strategy of promising and delivering exculpatory evidence or of poking holes in the 
prosecution’s case is a reasonable trail strategy, but telling the jury one will occur but instead 
following through on the other is “a recipe for failure”). But see, e.g., Turner v. Maryland, 318 
F.2d 852, 853−54 (4th Cir. 1963) (condemning counsel for not communicating with the defendant 
for the two weeks before trial commenced in order to ascertain whether any information relevant 
to his defense existed, but denying relief because the defendant in fact possessed no such infor-
mation). 
 103 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (requiring counsel to inform her de-
fendant about the deportation risks associated with the defendant’s plea); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
688 (noting the duties of counsel to confer with the defendant regarding important decisions, keep 
the defendant abreast of important developments throughout the prosecution’s case, and employ 
enough skill and knowledge to produce a fair trial, but allowing that this list of duties is not ex-
haustive); see also Williams, 340 F.3d at 671−72 (stating that not delivering testimony promised in 
an opening is not always constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel); Ouber, 293 F.3d at 27 
(noting that the intricacies of trials inevitably involve multiple mistakes, and only the most serious 
mistakes violate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel). 
 104 See People v. Paneglina, 199 Cal. Rptr. 916, 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that counsel 
is not obliged to make an opening statement, and that it can be reasonable trial strategy to wait 
until the State has closed its case before making an opening statement in order to preserve the 
element of surprise). 
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on that promise, courts must proceed with caution because of the negative 
impact an unfulfilled promise may have on a jury.105 
Critics of the two-prong Strickland v. Washington analysis argue that 
the standard upon which counsel’s performance is judged is not demanding 
enough.106 As the Supreme Court noted in Strickland, however, holding 
counsel to a higher standard could paradoxically harm defendants.107 In-
stead of raising the bar of criminal defense representation, a stricter stand-
ard could make court appointed attorneys, knowing that their strategies may 
be open to scrutiny and criticism by appellate courts, hesitant to take indi-
gent cases.108 The current standard thus allows for counsel taking indigent 
cases to be reasonably sure that their trial decisions will not be overly cri-
tiqued, and indigent clients can rely on willing counsel for their defense.109 
CONCLUSION 
In Bahtouh v. Smith, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the breaking of 
a promise to the jury that the defendant would testify by defense counsel 
did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court applied the 
Strickland v. Washington ineffective assistance of counsel standard, which 
allows for a broad range of potential trial tactics, only the most unreasona-
ble of which are deemed constitutionally deficient. The Eighth Circuit’s 
decision in Bahtouh is in accord with other circuit’s decisions regarding a 
defense counsel’s broken promise that the defendant would testify. Federal 
courts will not disturb the outcome of a trial where counsel promised the 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See Hampton, 347 F.3d at 259 (noting that breaking a promise to the jury undercuts the 
jury’s trust in the defendant and her attorney); McAleese, 1 F.3d at 166−67 (explaining that the 
reason for concluding that breaking a promise made in openings constitutes ineffective assistance 
of counsel is because the jury may draw negative inferences from the lack of the promised testi-
mony). This impact may be mitigated when, as in Bahtuoh’s case, the defense can explain the broken 
promise in closing arguments. See Bahtuoh II, 855 F.3d at 870 (counsel explained during closing 
arguments that he opted not to have Bahtuoh testify because the government didn’t prove their 
case and his truthful story came across in his grand jury testimony). 
 106 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst 
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1857−58 (1994) (lamenting that the stand-
ard for judging counsel is whether the representation was ineffective instead of requiring the rep-
resentation to be effective); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty 
Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 639, 640 
(1986) (considering Strickland v. Washington among the decisions that “seriously undermined” 
the defendant’s ability to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 
 107 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (noting that use of a more “intrusive” standard to evaluate 
counsel’s performance could “dampen the ardor” of counsel and dissuade counsel from accepting 
indigent cases). 
 108 Id. The Court also noted the possibility that after the first trial, a second would ensue to 
examine counsel’s tactical decisions. Id. 
 109 See id. (stating that more intense judicial scrutiny of counsel’s decisions could “under-
mine” trust between counsel and her client). 
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jury the defendant’s testimony but then broke the promise as long as the 
change in tactic is predicated on unforeseen circumstances that arose during 
the trial. When considering whether such a decision is unreasonable, how-
ever, courts should consider whether counsel weighed the possible effects 
that a broken promise could have on the jury. Because a lawyer’s broken 
promise can negatively reflect on her client, and possibly influence the ju-
ry’s evaluation of the case, courts ought to hold defense counsel accounta-
ble for considering the impact such a decision might have on the jury. This 
would add depth to the court’s analysis of such decisions, without creating a 
high standard for counsel, which critics worry could lead to fewer lawyers 
being willing to take on indigent defense assignments. 
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